
The AMLR is not a directive but a directly applicable regulation: as of July 10, 2027, it will replace the French transposition of the 4th and 5th directives. Scope, due diligence, beneficial owners, deadlines, sanctions — here is what is really changing.
People often refer to the AMLR as "the new anti-money laundering directive." This is the most common misconception about this text, and it is not a trivial one: the AMLR is not a directive, it is a regulation. A directive must be transposed — each Member State adapts it to its own law, at its own pace, and with its own room for interpretation. A regulation applies directly, as is, in all twenty-seven Member States, without the need for national legislation to implement it.
This is precisely why July 10, 2027 marks a reset rather than a simple update. On that date, Articles L. 561-1 et seq. of the Monetary and Financial Code — the French transposition of the 4th and 5th directives — will give way to the European text itself. Your internal procedures are not just changing in content: they are changing their legal basis.
This guide provides an overview of the AML package, its actual timeline, and what the regulation concretely changes for a French obligated entity.
The AMLR does not stand alone. Published in the Official Journal of the European Union on June 19, 2024, and having entered into force on July 9, 2024, it forms a set with three other texts:
AMLD6 repeals Directive (EU) 2015/849. Article 89 of the AMLR specifies that references to that directive are now to be construed as references to the regulation and AMLD6, in accordance with a correlation table set out in Annex VI. In practice, this is the most useful transition tool for a compliance team: it allows for mapping an existing framework article by article.
Article 90 of the AMLR is unambiguous: the text is "binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States." This has three practical consequences.
National discretion disappears. Regulations are not transposed: the provisions of the Monetary and Financial Code that replicate the content of the AMLR are no longer necessary. Only those elements that AMLD6 expressly leaves to the national level will remain in French law—the organization of the ACPR, the AMF, and Tracfin, the beneficial ownership register, the sanction regime, and the few explicitly provided national options.
The internal framework is changing its foundation. Any procedure, compliance note, risk map, or control matrix that cites "Article L. 561-5" or "Article R. 561-5-1" must be rewritten to reference the AMLR articles. This is not just a matter of form: these article numbers appear throughout control plans, audit reports, and responses to client questionnaires.
Comparability is now the rule. Until now, a group operating in several Member States applied different transpositions of the same text. From 2027, the standard will be identical everywhere—which simplifies group structures but also eliminates the ability to choose between jurisdictions.
AMLA will evaluate credit and financial institutions — and groups — active in at least six Member States, and will select those with a high residual risk profile. The regulation indicatively caps the first wave at around forty entities.
One point deserves attention: when no institution from a given Member State is selected, AMLA conducts an additional selection procedure in that state. In other words, at least one French entity is expected to fall within the scope of direct supervision. For all others, the ACPR remains the supervisor — but under the coordination of AMLA.
Article 3 adds several categories to the list of obligated entities: crowdfunding service providers and intermediaries, non-bank mortgage and consumer credit intermediaries , traders and intermediaries in cultural goods and high-value goods from €10,000, warehouse operators in free zones, providers of investment-based immigration services, non-financial mixed holding companies, and real estate agents, including for rentals with a monthly rent of €10,000 or more.
A point often misreported: crypto-asset service providers do not constitute a new category under Article 3. They are obligated because the definition of "financial institution" encompasses them. The regulation then specifically targets them on several points—enhanced due diligence for crypto-asset correspondent relationships, exclusion from the €1,000 threshold applicable to occasional fund transfers, and the prohibition of anonymous accounts.
Articles 19 to 28 establish an identical due diligence procedure throughout the Union. Two structural changes:
The content of the identification process is no longer negotiable. Article 22 provides an exhaustive list of the data to be collected: all first names and surnames, the place and full date of birth, nationalities, national identification number where applicable, and place of residence. More flexible — or more stringent — national practices will have to converge.
Sanctions screening is now part of the due diligence process itself. Article 20 requires verifying whether the client or their beneficial owners are subject to targeted financial sanctions, just as with identification. It is no longer a parallel check; it is a step in the due diligence process.
Added to this are specific timeframes to be integrated into systems:
This is the point about which the most misinformation is circulating. As of July 10, 2027, the threshold remains set at 25% of capital ownership or voting rights (Art. 52). The much-discussed "drop to 15%" does not exist at this date: the regulation provides that by no later than July 10, 2029, the Commission may, via delegated acts and for high-risk categories of companies only, set a lower threshold—a floor of 15% and a ceiling strictly below 25%.
What is actually changing is the method. Article 51 states that control by other means is assessed "independently and in parallel" to capital participation: the two criteria are cumulative, not alternative. Indirect holdings are calculated by multiplying along each chain, then adding the chains together, taking into account all levels of ownership.
Two new obligations are worth noting:
The regime for third countries is overhauled into three categories — significant strategic deficiencies, compliance deficiencies, and specific and serious threats — identified by the Commission through delegated acts (Arts. 29 to 31).
The regime for politically exposed persons is specified: authorization from a high-level member of the hierarchy, establishment of the source of wealth and the source of funds, and ongoing enhanced monitoring. Each Member State and the Commission shall publish a list of prominent public functions (Art. 42 and 43). The regulation also governs the exit from PEP status, which was long left to individual discretion (Art. 45).
A significant new development for private banking and wealth management: Article 34 imposes specific measures when a high-risk relationship involves the processing of assets of at least 5 million euros by bespoke services, for a client whose total wealth reaches 50 million euros — excluding primary residence. Added to this are additional details on the source of funds and a mechanism for preventing conflicts of interest.
Article 77 sets a retention period of five years, calculated from the end of the business relationship, the execution of the occasional transaction, or the date of refusal to enter into a relationship. At the end of this period, the regulation mandates theerasure of personal data.
This is a fundamental shift. Where directives previously allowed states the option of extending retention, the regulation imposes an active obligation to delete—making this a matter of system architecture, not just retention policy. The text also specifies that retained documents must not be redacted.
Article 18 permits the outsourcing of certain tasks but sets clear boundaries: the obligated entity must inform its supervisor before the service provider begins performing the tasks. Service providers are considered part of the entity, and the entity "remains fully responsible" for any acts or omissions related to the outsourced tasks.
For any fintech or institution that relies on identity verification or document analysis providers, this is a new formality to incorporate into your timeline—and a reason to rigorously document your processing chain.
Article 80 establishes a European ceiling of €10,000 for cash payments. Many interpreted this as a relaxation of the French €1,000 limit: it is the opposite. The same article expressly provides that lower national limits already in force continue to apply. The French ceiling, set by the Monetary and Financial Code, therefore remains at €1,000 for a debtor with a tax domicile in France or acting in a professional capacity.
The sanctions regime is not in the AMLR but in AMLD6, which delegates it to Member States while setting minimum thresholds.
For serious, repeated, or systematic breaches for internal control, due diligence, reporting, or record-keeping obligations, the maximum financial penalty must reach at least twice the benefit derived from the breach, or one million euros if that amount is higher.
For a credit or financial institution, the floor rises to 10 million euros or 10% of total annual turnover — whichever is higher — for a legal entity, and to 5 million euros for a natural person.
The deadline may seem far off. It is not for those who need to overhaul a framework, reclassify a customer database, and adapt systems. A reasonable roadmap:
The AMLR reveals a constant: the regulation transforms principles into deadlines and mandatory fields. Annual or five-year reviews, sixty-day verification, fourteen-day reporting, five-year deletion, closed lists of identification data, and screening integrated into due diligence. These are requirements that manual systems struggle to scale, and which supervisors will be able to audit line by line.
Dataleon automates this chain: collection and analysis of identity and corporate documents, structured extraction, forgery detection, beneficial owner identification, screening, and timestamped retention of audit trails — in France, Europe, and the OHADA region.